"First-rate intelligence" and the danger of waffling

The Ha'aretz article posted earlier this evening raises a good question: why the censorship in history courses? Why would one be opposed to sharing both sides of a narrative such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Are we not always informed - and rightly so - that it is best to see all sides of a situation before attempting to come to any conclusions? After all, in the words of F. Scott Fitzgerald: "The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function."

It's that last part that gets us, though - "and still retain the ability to function." See, it's just so much easier to get along in life without this conflict of ideas. Thus the phrase "blissfully ignorant." Knowing only the Israeli side of the story, for instance, makes it that much easier to be pro-Israel, and in the most extreme and self-assured way (long-live-Avigdor-Lieberman style). Likewise, focusing only on the Palestinian narrative also yields an obvious bias rather than a balanced understanding.

This matter, of course, is nothing new; any concerned government knows to keep an eye on the education of it's citizens. Just what are those children learning in class? Can we say evolution and the Scopes trial? Or perhaps the Big Bang Theory? Maybe recalling European-inspired colonial education? Choice of terms when learning about foreign cultures? Or hey, how about analyzing why the Middle East, for all intents and purposes, lacks "great powers"?

The Lustick article, in my humble opinion, raised some interesting and relevant points. Namely, "no great state in today's world has arisen peacefully or legally" (Lustick 658), combined with the emphasis of Western intervention in Middle Eastern conflicts, thereby apparently preventing this "survival of the fittest," realist (yes?) method of states' rising to regional power. Indeed, all logical: states gain sway and influence with conflict, weeding out the weak members of the herd, yet we now attempt to prevent this weeding out, the outsiders in the West instead priding themselves on protecting those same weak members in the name of sovereignty (and human rights, frankly).

My question while reading this, though: Of course we can't blatantly condone bloody state obliteration in the name of regional hegemony in the long run (and Lustick makes a point of noting that he does not mean to condone actions such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait)... so how are "great powers" to come about in the Middle East, taking into account Lustick's argument that a.it cannot be done peacefully, and b.we won't allow it to be done violently? If the goals of development of a greater power in the Middle East and avoiding all-out interstate war in the region are inherently opposition, as Lustick suggests, how are we to hold to both ideas and "retain the ability to function," ie do something about it?

Thus the fear of muddling up citizens' minds with too many facts and viewpoints: it's overwhelming, potentially confusing, and inherently conflicting. And all of that, of course, can be flat-out depressing. Then again, what good is it to grasp these conflicting ideas if we then don't know what to do with them? As Fitzgerald points out, there's more to it than just understanding opposing ideas (though that in and of itself is quite the task); we must then remain functional, able to act. Open-minded but not gullible, understanding but not waffling, balanced but not indecisive. It's no walk in the park, that much we can say with surety.

(Opus, Berkeley Breathed)